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Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian
Context. By Daniel A. Bell. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006. xii+379 Pp. Paperback, ISBN 13: 978-0-691-12308-0.)jocp_1637 157..170
Beginning with an account of Ronald Dworkin’s two-week visit to
China in 2002 as an example of how “uniquely parochial” post–World
War II Western liberal democratic theory and theorists have been,
Daniel A. Bell proceeds to examine how theories of human rights,
democracy, and capitalism (“main hallmarks of liberal democracy”)
have become substantially modified when transmitted to East Asian
societies. Bell brings a wealth of interesting material to support his
argument that “[w]hat is right for EastAsians does not simply involve
implementing Western-style political practices when the opportunity
presents itself; it involves drawing upon East Asian political realities
and cultural traditions that are defensible to contemporary East
Asians” (p. 8). This review focuses on the middle section on democ-
racy and deals only briefly with the first and last sections.
The first section opposes the imposition of universalist human
rights theories on East Asia and argues that there are better alterna-
tives for EastAsian states to recommend or condemn actions morally,
such as the “just war” discourse in theMencius. Instead of attempting
through intercultural dialogues to reconcile the different traditions in
the abstract to achieve some “inter-civilizational” human rights, Bell
recommends engagement between theorists and practitioners in
order to find workable solutions to the ethical dilemmas and political
difficulties confronting human rights organizations operating in East
Asia. However, reflections on practice need to go much further than
Bell suggests if it is to advance the theorizing of human rights.
It is questionable if there is more than contingent conjunction
between capitalism and liberal democracy, but the last section is inter-
esting for its ideas delineating alternativeEastAsian capitalism,demo-
cratic or not. Confucian emphasis on material welfare and care for
needy family members,which differ from both right-wing (libertarian)
and left-wing (Rawlsian) liberalism,provides support for illiberal con-
straints on property rights. In dealing with global labor migration,
equal citizenship rights recommended by liberals may not offer the
best answers to concerns that matter most to the migrants themselves,
whereas formal and informal arrangements that encourage affective
relations may serve them better in East Asian contexts. Confucian
influence rather than liberal democracy has contributed to economic
productivity in East Asian states and facilitated care for those often
neglected in a capitalist system. In Bell’s view, despite flaws that argue
for reform in various aspects, there is much to be said for East Asian
capitalism in which affective ties have greater function and value.
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The section on democracy, understood in the “minimal” sense as
free and fair competitive elections under universal franchise to fill
policy-making positions, begins and ends with education, recognizing
that democracy yields good government only when citizens are
equipped through education with the motivation and ability to par-
ticipate in democratic rule. Chapter 8 is an interesting account of
Bell’s efforts to practice “inclusive multiculturalism” in his classroom
in Singapore, as a contribution to nurturing intercultural sensitivity
and interethnic harmony that increase the possibility of democratic
solutions to problems of interethnic conflicts.1 This optimism is at
odds with the skepticism about both the viability and desirability of
democracy in East Asia in the rest of the section. Chapter 5 explores
a link between the Greek emphasis on physical education and active
citizenship which raises doubts about the latter, and so about democ-
racy (not just liberal democracy) which requires it.According to Bell,
ancient Greek active citizenship glorifies warfare and competitive-
ness, which is less defensible in contemporary societies; even more
problematic, it threatens “to overwhelm all our other communal com-
mitments, particularly ties to the family” (p. 149).
Bell seems to think that to be an active citizen would take up more
time and effort than the average family-centered East Asian could
afford. Consequently, he argues that democracy will take “minimal”
forms within a larger framework of elite politics, since the average
EastAsian’s “self-understanding” assumes that governing is the job of
the elite.As an observation of existing East Asian priorities in every-
day life, this may be so, but it would be an imperfect reality that belies
the Confucian teaching that self-cultivation, ordering the family, gov-
erning the state, and pacifying the world constitute a single ideal that
should be everyone’s aspiration and responsibility. If Mencius (whom
Bell often quotes as representative of Confucians) is right in averring
that everyone can be a sage, then Bell’s assumption may be mis-
guided. Or it might be that many East Asians have not ventured into
politics because undemocratic politics is not just unrewarding, but
often downright dangerous, which makes focusing on the family the
sensible course for the average individual.
Chapter 6 offers a reconciliation of elitism with democracy in the
form of “a bi-cameral legislature, with a democratically elected lower
house and a ‘Confucian’ upper house composed of representatives
selected on the basis of competitive examinations” (pp. 165–66). Bell
maintains that while the idea of government by an elite of the wise
and virtuous is not unique to Confucianism, “Confucian societies
institutionalized a stable mechanism capable of producing at least on
occasion what was widely seen as a ‘government of the best and
brightest’” (p. 154). China’s two-thousand-year-old meritocratic civil
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service examination and its various contemporary approximations in
Japan and Singapore have worked well and often enough for East
Asians to appreciate entrusting political decisions to those who are
“intelligent, adaptable, long-term minded, and public spirited” (char-
acteristics that are not all that different from Confucian virtues
according to Bell). This could be better than those who owe their
career to the electorate, or worse, special interests which men short on
wisdom and virtue, and are liable to put short-term, narrow, and
selfish interests first.
However, unelected elites may and do abuse their power without
the accountability and transparency that accompany equal political
participation in a democracy, as Bell shows with actual examples and
so he promotes the need to combine elitism and democracy. Besides
discussing the selection process and measures to ensure that the
upper house (xianshiyuan ) functions independently and effec-
tively as an elite free to contribute its talent, wisdom, and virtue to the
task of government, Bell proposes the use of constitutional mecha-
nisms to resolve conflicts between the two houses. His evaluation of
various possibilities for achieving a balance of power argues that a
relatively weak Xianshiyuan is more feasible, but a stronger Xian-
shiyuan is more desirable.What drives Bell seems to be a mistrust of
people’s capacity to govern themselves, and such mistrust undermines
democracy. If this is not a temporary lack that could be alleviated by
education and more open public debates, for example, then what Bell
is proposing is not so much a different kind of democracy more suited
to East Asia, but an East Asian elitism that makes minimal and
probably cosmetic concessions to people’s demands and governs
paternalistically for the people’s good, even against their wishes.
In chapter 7, Bell shows how less-than-democratic East Asian
states give minority groups a better deal than democracy because
political elites have successfully resisted majority nationalism, and
have been more willing to strike bargains with minority groups that
benefit both parties. The dynamic of pressures to promote nation-
building centered on the majority culture having to be reined in by
minority rights in order to protect minority groups is absent in these
states. Critics could challenge Bell’s interpretation of the events and
history of the various countries used as examples to support his argu-
ment. In the case of Singapore, one should at least seek corroborating
evidence from historians before accepting Lee Kuan Yew’s presenta-
tion of all, or even the majority, of the Chinese in Singapore as
favoring Mandarin as the national and official language (especially as
an example of how Lee was justified in ignoring the wishes of the
people).The Chinese community was in fact divided into the Chinese-
educated and English-educated, with a majority who had little edu-
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cation. The last group could have been mobilized to favor Mandarin
as a matter of loyalty to ancestral tradition (although Mandarin is not
really the mother tongue of most Chinese in Singapore, as they came
from the southern provinces of China, such as Fujian and Guang-
dong).Nevertheless, they could just as easily have been swayed by the
argument that English would give everyone the means for a better
living.
Evidence that the subsequent decline of Chinese-medium schools
was due not so much to government neglect as decline in enrollment
resulting from parents’ choice indicates that the economic argument
might have carried more weight than cultural nationalism. It could be
argued that the special geopolitical and historical circumstances of
Singapore present little motivation for majoritarian nationalism on
the part of the people, which would cast doubt on Bell’s claim that it
is an example of the political elite’s greater ability to resist majority
nationalism in less-than-democratic states. If the Chinese-educated
elite had won power, it is likely that Mandarin would have been given
a dominant place in Singapore, but not necessarily because it was
what the people wanted. So, as it turns out, Singapore was fortunate
that, as Bell pointed out, the PAP “founding fathers” were English-
educated and therefore benefited from making English the official
language and main medium of education (p. 194), and had no qualms
relegating Mandarin and the “mother tongues” of other ethnic groups
to second languages in schools.
With the example of Indonesia’s Chinese minority’s ability to
prosper under Suharto, clearly Bell does not intend to condone the
corruption that is central to that “bargain.” However, the example
reveals a more general problem with bargains between minority
groups and less-than-democratic governments. Such governments are
not accountable to the people in a transparent system, and often
would agree to bargains that benefit the few individuals in power at
the expense of the majority. Democratic governments, even if the
members are mainly from the majority ethnic groups, could also
bargain with minority groups. Such bargains in democracies would be
more likely to benefit both the majority and the minority and would
not, as evidenced by what happened in Indonesia, increase resent-
ment against a minority perceived to be rich and privileged (even
though not everyone of that group is so).While it is true that where
such resentment exists, democratization could endanger lives and
properties of resented minority groups, and therefore caution as
advised by Bell is certainly warranted, it just means that the process of
democratization should be planned and controlled, rather than indefi-
nitely postponed. The ethnic violence in Indonesia in 1998 is due to
disintegration of the state’s ability to maintain law and order.Democ-
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ratization need not mean such extreme political instability. If any-
thing, it is prolonged oppression and injustice under authoritarian
governments, rather than democratization per se, that cause such
chaos once the state power weakens under the stress of populist
discontent. If there is a lesson for China and other less-than-
democratic states in Asia, it should be the wisdom of democratizing
gradually from a position of strength, while keeping the state’s power
for ensuring law and order intact, instead of being forced to “democ-
ratize” overnight by a disgruntled populace.
Sor-Hoon Tan
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Endnote
1. Bell mentions that he was told to takeMill’sOn the Subjection ofWomen off his reading
list while was a member of the Political Science Department at the National University
of Singapore in the 1990s.The university has changed much since then. Since assuming
my appointment in the university in 2000, I have not heard of any staff being asked
to change their syllabi for ideological/political reasons. We have also been teaching
Feminist philosophy, and implemented a Gender Studies minor program, without any
grandparents or parents turning up to complain about the corruption of their youth.
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Ethos of Chinese Culture. By Wang Keping. (Beijing: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 2007. Pp. 1–241. Paperback, ISBN 978-7-119-04809-3.)
Constructing a model of transcultural transformation capable of loos-
ening cultural boundaries, breaking homo-cultural-centrism of any
kind, and promoting transformational creation in both a national and
cosmopolitan sense are the objectives of Wang Keping’s Ethos of
Chinese Culture.
In contrast to ancient Greek thought, ancient Chinese thought has
not been properly studied by scholars in the West. In order to reveal
the Chinese ways of thinking and at the same time to create the
context for of a meaningful dialogue between East and West, in this
book, as in other works of his,Wang follows the same twofold strategy.
He examines the influences of various currents of Western thought
(idealism, romanticism, pragmatism, and so on) on Chinese scholars
since the late nineteenth century, while tracing the components of
Chinese thought that have made possible the convergence ofWestern
and Chinese cultural traditions. In so doing, the author constructs a
model of universalization of cultural localities that opposes economic
globalization, which, with its positivistic reductionism and globalizing
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